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CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: THE CASE 
FOR A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
DISTRIBUTION 
PAULO BARROZO* 
ATTAINING CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 
Critique is the standard model of legal scholarship. The typ-
ical article or book circumscribes an aspect of the legal order, 
redescribes it as policy, criticizes the policy according to effi-
ciency or axiological criteria, and proposes some minor or mod-
erate improvement to it.1 This critical ethos is not surprising—
the modern mind is restive. 
This standard model of legal critique and improvement is 
politically stabilizing, practically effective, and intelligible only 
because it is set within a powerful paradigm of law and legal 
thought. I have named this paradigm The Great Alliance. It is 
great because of its intellectual brilliance and political resilience. 
It is an alliance because it brings together three of the main 
forces in thought and politics in modern times: historicism, ra-
tionalism, and democracy.2  
 
*Of Boston College Law School. Newton, MA. 
 1. Ronald Dworkin analogized the most self-conscious version of this form of 
interrogative attitude about the law to the emergence of an “interpretive attitude” 
within a culture of conventionalism (a normative culture theretofore stagnated at 
the stage of “taboo,” as he put it). See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 46–49 
(1986). Looking in from outside, Jürgen Habermas makes a similar point. JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 5 (William Rehg trans., Polity Press 1997) (1992) 
(“[T]he received concept of practical reason also acquires a different, more or less 
heuristic status. It no longer provides a direct blueprint for a normative theory of 
law and morality. Rather, it offers a guide for reconstructing the network of dis-
courses that, aimed at forming opinions and preparing decisions, provides the ma-
trix from which democratic authority emerges. From this perspective, the forms of 
communication that confer legitimacy on political will-formation, legislation, and 
the administration of justice appear as part of a more encompassing process in 
which the lifeworlds of modern societies are rationalized under the pressure of sys-
temic imperatives. At the same time, such a reconstruction would provide a critical 
standard, against which actual practices—the opaque and perplexing reality of the 
constitutional state—could be evaluated.”). 
 2. Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in Modern 
Law, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 235, n. 1–2 (2015). 
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Ultimately, only through The Great Alliance has liberalism 
become operative in legal thought and concrete in legal institu-
tions and practice. The Great Alliance has afforded legal actors 
justificatory powers3 in a form of knowledge and discourse—le-
gal doctrine—sufficiently capable of efficient problem resolution 
steered by values prevalent in modern liberal legal systems. 
Seen in this light, legal doctrine enhances both the relative ef-
fectiveness and the relative legitimacy of legal orders. Enframed 
by The Great Alliance, structural components of liberal public 
life claim justification as having passed the historicist as well as 
the rationalist tests for institutional evolution: historical au-
thenticity and an intrinsic rational core. This serious claim to 
justification solidified liberalism and unleashed its vast norma-
tive and practical affordability. With considerable institutional 
stability, liberalism afforded everything from the emergence of 
the welfare state and the United Nations to generations of indi-
vidual and collective rights with colossal comparative gains. 
Furthermore, vaulted by The Great Alliance, the critical ethos of 
the standard model of legal scholarship in liberal polities is 
meaningful to legal actors, structurally preservative, and evolu-
tionarily productive.4  
 
 3. This Essay is not the occasion to discuss the themes of meaning, interpre-
tation, and justification. Beyond Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas, see RAINER 
FORST, NORMATIVITY AND POWER: ANALYZING SOCIAL ORDERS OF JUSTIFICATION 
(Ciaran Cronin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2017) (2015) and ANA PAULA DE 
BARCELLOS, DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS E DIREITO À JUSTIFICATIVA: DEVIDO 
PROCEDIMENTO NA ELABORAÇÃO NORMATIVA (2017). 
 4. The critical ethos is evolutionarily productive and structurally inert for the 
reasons I present in Paulo Barrozo, Law in Time: Legal Theory and Legal History, 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Barrozo, Law in Time: Legal 
Theory & Legal History]. I have elsewhere referred in these terms to the kind of 
healthy parochial dialogue carried out as the standard model of legal scholarship. 
Paulo Barrozo, Institutional Conditions of Contemporary Legal Thought, in 
SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 114, 122 (Justin Desautels-Stein 
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017) [hereinafter Barrozo, Institutional Conditions of 
Contemporary Legal Thought] (“Every political organization should hope to educate 
a fraction of its members to engage in an aspirationally endless legal dialogue about 
the foundation and unfolding of the organization. I consider constitutional commen-
tary in the United States to be a fine example of such dialogue, contributing to 
social cohesion and cultural reproduction over time. In my view, this dialogue 
should remain unburdened by expectations of higher knowledge, insight, and im-
agination. I argue only that such types of domesticated dialogue would benefit from 
enlarging their analytical and discursive capabilities. The best way to achieve that 
enlargement is to subject future participants of the dialogue to the study of the 
traditions of high legal thought from which the diluted ideas they will one day de-
ploy originally come.”). 
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Whereas critique is the standard model of legal analysis un-
der The Great Alliance, critical legal thought means something 
other than this standard model. It will not earn its title just by 
genealogizing law or by being contrarian, rebellious, performa-
tive, experimentalist, expert, policy-smart, decisionist, or 
“woke.”5 Currently, critical legal thought relies excessively on 
the political identity of networks of scholars to set the bounda-
ries between itself and other global critiques of law and legal 
thought found for example in the libertarian or the natural law 
traditions. This excessive reliance should instead be the first tar-
get of critical legal thought. 
Critical legal thought faces higher and more demanding the-
oretical requirements than is generally recognized. Three such 
requirements set critical legal thought apart from and above not 
only the critical ethos characteristic of the standard model of le-
gal analysis but also of more ambitious varieties of global cri-
tique of law. 
First, in the rationalist tradition,6 critical legal thought 
starts with a sustained examination of any reliance on intuition, 
experience, self-interest, convention (cognitive, semantic, prac-
tical, ethical, etc.), secularized dogma, and other mechanisms of 
self-convincement as a source for evaluation of the truth status 
of propositions, the soundness of conceptions of right or good, or 
 
 5. Michel Foucault offers that critique as an attitude of resistance to domina-
tion should take priority over the Kantian heritage of critique as epistemic libera-
tion before liberation can be anything else. Or, as Marc Djaballah has put it: “Fou-
cault himself urges that the most pressing task of being critical is to reverse this 
theoretical denial of the ontological motivations that condition it as a practice, and 
to interrogate knowledge in its relation to domination, abuses of power, and subjec-
tion to the politics of truth.” Marc Djaballah, Foucault on Kant, Enlightenment, and 
Being Critical, in A COMPANION TO FOUCAULT 264, 277 (Christopher Falzon, Tim-
othy O’Leary & Jana Sawicki eds., 2013). The tradition of kinetic democracy urges 
(as Roberto Unger, Jeremy Waldron, and others do) that legal thought assist in the 
work of a citizenry embarked on democratic institutional experimentation as a 
source of legitimate resistance to the preservationist ethos of law. Both approaches 
(the Foucauldian and the experimentalist) insufficiently understand that critical 
legal thought requires the rigor of reason and its justificatory powers before per-
formative resistance and experimentalist imagination can play their ancillary role. 
See ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996); JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); see also ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE 
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED (2009); Michael C. Dorf & Charles 
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 
(1998); HAUNKE BRUNKHORST, DEMOKRATISCHER EXPERIMENTALISMUS: POLITIK 
IN DER KOMPLEXEN GESELLSCHAFT (1998). 
 6. From Kant to Habermas. 
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the legitimacy of extant states of affairs. Critical legal thought 
starts there because only the rigor of reason is able sometimes 
to sufficiently counter distorting influences upon thinking.7 
Controlling for rare insight, only the rigor of reason is some-
times able to reach farther than the standard legal critique or 
the opportunistic dives into the cracks that anyone can open in 
the structures, practices, and consciousness of the time or the 
mapping out of the contradictions of reflective equilibrium juris-
prudence. All these types of critique are helpful, and it is a good 
thing that, as teachable skills, they have made their way into 
legal pedagogy and are now ubiquitous. Yet, critical legal 
thought means more than that. 
Second, critical legal thought is, as suggested, structurally 
bent toward comprehensiveness and systematicity. It constantly 
plots the arc of the kind of theory that earlier subversive think-
ers such as Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, Jer-
emy Bentham, or Karl Marx lifted against their received tradi-
tions of jurisprudence.  
On this topic, we can classify legal thinking in an ideal-typ-
ical manner according to viewpoint and scope—enclosed or en-
closing—and to timeframe—synchronic or diachronic. Whereas 
enclosed legal thinking remains bounded by the historical, doc-
trinal and policy viewpoints of actors qua actors of a legal order, 
enclosing legal thinking theorizes the nature and evolution of 
law, including the internal legal actors’ enclosed thinking.8 As 
an abstracting classification, this is not a typology of thinkers 
but of thinking. In any event, critical legal thought best earns 
its credentials when it succumbs to its structural tendency to 
operate at the comprehensive and systematic level of synchronic 
or diachronic enclosing legal thought. 
To be sure, for some time now, enclosing legal thought has 
fallen out of fashion. I have elsewhere offered a critique of this 
popular resistance to grand theory.9 However, if it is to earn its 
 
 7. Including the types of distortion theorized in the tradition of the Frankfurt 
School as social pathologies of reason. 
 8. I develop these categories in Barrozo, Law in Time: Legal Theory & Legal 
History, supra note 4. There I note to “[k]eep in mind that this typology is not one 
of types of legal mind, but rather one of types of explanations that legal minds pro-
duce. Aquinas, Bacon, Kant, Savigny, Hegel, Jhering and Holmes all authored doc-
trinal explanations in addition to other types of explanation they are best known 
for.” Id. at 394–95. 
 9. Barrozo, Institutional Conditions of Contemporary Legal Thought, supra 
note 4. 
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title, critical legal thought should resist this Faustian conven-
tion against grand theory. Only comprehensive and systematic 
legal thought has a chance at being critical in the sense I mean 
it, for there is no other way to know, first, where any fragmen-
tary10 critique fits in the larger structure of the nature and evo-
lution of law and legal thought and, second, whether and how 
reason is structurally and evolutionarily effective in law.11 In-
tellectual fashions come and go. Such fashions—as the conven-
tion supporting intellectual minimalism12—that demand a 
larger than usual intellectual sacrifice tend to go away sooner 
than others that do not. Critical legal thought is in the vanguard 
of abandoning this particular fashion of resistance to enclosing 
legal thought.  
Third, critical legal thought of the order I mean is norma-
tive. It engages in constructive normativity, articulating the jus-
tification for holding freedom, flourishing, equality, solidarity or 
dignity, and respect supreme and for spelling out their myriad 
entailments, including their distributive entailments.13 Political 
 
 10. “Yet the characteristic mark of the thinker’s activity is to determine for it-
self what it is to accomplish and serve, and this not in fragmentary fashion but 
totally.” MAX HORKHEIMER, Traditional and Critical Theory, in CRITICAL THEORY: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 188, 242–43 (Matthew J. O’Connell trans., Continuum Publ’g Co. 
1982) (1968). 
 11. For an argument of how critical legal history fits in the evolution of law in 
complex societies, see Barrozo, Law in Time: Legal Theory & Legal History, supra 
note 4. An account of “historically effective reason” animates the tradition of critical 
theory that runs from Hegel and Horkheimer to Habermas and Honneth. An excel-
lent summary of this critical project is found in AXEL HONNETH, PATHOLOGIES OF 
REASON: ON THE LEGACY OF CRITICAL THEORY (James Ingram trans., Columbia 
Univ. Press 2009) (2007). 
 12. Barrozo, Institutional Conditions of Contemporary Legal Thought, supra 
note 4, at 120 (“Minimalism is a multifold phenomenon. First and foremost, it has 
an intellectual aspect. In this first sense, minimalism is the view that the learning 
of—and what is to be learned in—law is reducible, first, to socialization into guild-
member attitudes and jargon and, second, to learning rules, precedents, and tech-
nical notions, all mixed up with an often superficial form of cost-benefit analysis. It 
might be suggested that, psychologically, many would experience intellectual min-
imalism as reassuring: as offering an undemanding level of subject-matter mastery 
that allows those so trained to deploy lawyerly attitudes, language, and technique 
to arrive at smart answers to contained legal questions. However, intellectual min-
imalism is not the same as anti-intellectualism. The self-understanding of those 
who teach and study the law is that they are highly intellectually motivated and 
sharp. I agree. What distinguishes intellectual minimalism from anti-intellectual-
ism is that the former views the world and the discourses that seek to make sense 
of and to engage with it as essentially simplifiable.”). 
 13. Writing on Foucault, Habermas, quoting Nancy Fraser, asks, “Why is 
struggle preferred to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted?” Jürgen 
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preferences based on sensibility, impulse, intuition, emotion, so-
cio-psychological conditioning, and the attitudinal patterns and 
conventions they feed into are the targets, not the source, of crit-
ical legal thought.14 
In relation to this third—normative—aspect of critical legal 
thought, an old lesson needs relearning. One of the prêt-à-porter 
modes of both standard critique and fragmented critical theory 
is genealogy, in the magnificent vein opened by Rousseau and 
Nietzsche and enlarged by Freud and Foucault.15 The skills to 
conduct a genealogy are possessed en masse in the academy and 
beyond, and no human creation—none—deserves protection 
from it. However, genealogy has no explanatory or evaluative fi-
nal word on existing legal orders or on any parts of them. Legal 
orders eventually stand or fall to critique for genealogy-inde-
pendent reasons. Hegel thus recasts this old Kantian lesson, 
with an inverted signal: 
[E]ven if the determinations of right are rightful and ra-
tional, it is one thing to demonstrate that this is so . . . and 
another to depict their historical emergence and the 
 
Habermas, Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again, in 
CRITIQUE AND POWER: RECASTING THE FOUCAULT/HABERMAS DEBATE 79, 96 (Mi-
chael Kelly ed., 1994). The implications of his genealogy force Foucault to beg the 
question about the normative basis of social criticism. But as he begs the question, 
the modern humanistic normative paradigm makes a covert re-entry onto the stage: 
“if one tries to glean the standards implicitly appealed to in his indictments of dis-
ciplinary power, one encounters familiar determinations from the normativistic 
language games that he has explicitly rejected.” Id. The tradition of the Frankfurt 
School offers that critique must be liberating by reason of its combining explanation 
of domination and the prescription of freedom. See HORKHEIMER, supra note 10. 
But the critical theory of the Frankfurt tradition trades—at a great loss—imagina-
tion for immanence. In doing so, it misapprehends the content of immanence, for 
what kind of thinking or praxis is not immanent?  
 14. Lest one wishes to count solely on fortune for having been socialized in the 
2020s Boston as opposed to the 1930s Munich. 
 15. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND 
FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN (1755), reprinted in ROUSSEAU: THE 
DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS 113 (Victor Gourevitch ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE 
SCIENCES AND ARTS (1750), reprinted in ROUSSEAU: THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER 
EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS 1 (Victor Gourevitch ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (1887), reprinted in BASIC 
WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE 437 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., Modern Library 
2000); SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey 
trans., W. W. Norton & Co. standard ed. 1989) (1930); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage 
Books 1995) (1975). 
  
2021] A JURISPRUDENCE OF DISTRIBUTION 1049 
 
circumstances, eventualities, needs, and incidents which led 
to their introduction. This kind of demonstration and (prag-
matic) cognition in terms of proximate and remote historical 
causes is often called ‘explanation’, or even more commonly 
‘comprehension’, in the belief . . . that this kind of historical 
demonstration is all—or rather, the one essential thing—that 
needs to be done in order to comprehend the law or a legal 
institution. . . . By disregarding the difference in question, it 
becomes possible to shift the point of view and to turn the 
request for a true justification into a justification by circum-
stances.16 
Critical legal thought is thus rationalist, grand, and norma-
tive theorizing. There is no place outside one of these big things. 
There is only knowing or not knowing that you are inside one.  
EQUALITY AND DISTRIBUTION 
Critical jurisprudence aims reason at encumbrances to free-
dom. The specifically modern addition to this age-old effort that 
reaches back to Plato and Cicero is the understanding that the 
achievement of freedom has not one but two moments. First, 
there is the moment of emancipation, where the objective is to 
identify, explain, delegitimize, and remove obstacles to freedom. 
The second moment is by nature everlasting, for it seeks to iden-
tify, explain, and justify that which it takes to sustain freedom 
over time.  
In this second moment, a principle of equality rises.17 Of 
course, from the moment that freedom becomes a universal pri-
mary good alongside social order, the requirement of equality 
presents itself both as a measure of the equal distribution of free-
dom among all persons and as an evocation of the effects of that 
distribution on every other type of distribution. Kant’s concept 
of law demonstrates this: “Right is therefore the sum of the con-
ditions under which the choice of one can be united with the 
choice of another in accordance with a universal law of 
 
 16. G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 29–30 (Allen W. 
Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1820). 
 17. I first developed some of the following ideas in Paulo Barrozo, A Idéia de 
Igualdade e as Ações Afirmativas, 63 LUA NOVA 103 (2004). 
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freedom.”18 Sociologically and normatively, there is only free-
dom as equal freedom for all; and equal freedom for all entails 
sufficient equalization of the social conditions for freedom. 
Critical legal thought’s commitment to freedom as a pri-
mary good thus presses it into analyses and evaluations of 
courses of action and states of affairs in terms of whether they 
encumber or emancipate, undermine or sustain freedom, chief 
among which is the materialization of the principle of equality. 
In this spirit, critical legal thought asks with respect to the vic-
tims of violation of the principle of equality: whether they are (I) 
individuals/groups on the basis of their condition as such, (II) 
individuals/groups on the basis of some special and transitory or 
permanent characteristic, or (III) individuals/groups on the ba-
sis of special and transitory or permanent circumstances. ‘I’ re-
flects a kind of inequality directed at or resulting from some 
characteristic linked to an individual’s or group’s claimed or at-
tributed identity. ‘II’ reflects a kind of inequality that targets in-
dividuals or groups because of a characteristic that, while not 
necessarily defining their identity in a contextually relevant 
manner, possesses some form of social visibility that triggers the 
violation of equality. ‘III,’ in turn, refers to inequality associated 
with a set of circumstances involving individuals and groups and 
resulting from their position in relation to those circumstances, 
irrespective of their individual or group identity (I) or of their 
characteristics (II). 
Next, critical legal thought asks with respect to the objects 
of violation of the principle of equality: whether they consist in 
(I) equality of X, (II) equality of opportunity to attain X, and (III) 
equality before X. In this analytical scheme, ‘I’ stands for une-
qual possession or ownership of a good, whatever the good is; ‘II’ 
describes an unequal relative chance that individuals or groups 
have of attaining ownership or possession of a desired good, 
where their unequal chance can be traced back to an inequality 
of opportunity to participate in the causality chain that brings, 
or may bring, possession or ownership of that good to its partic-
ipants; and ‘III’ reflects a situation where individuals or groups 
receive an unequal share of privileges/entitlements to a public 
good, such as legislation, for instance. 
 
 18. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
RIGHT, reprinted in METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 27 (Mary J. Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2017) (1797). 
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With respect to the social pervasiveness of the violation of 
the principle of equality, critical legal thought asks whether it is 
(I) directed or (II) encompassing. What is important here is to 
define the equality violation according to its ultimate effect. 
Thus, in the case of ‘I,’ the violation’s effect remains limited to 
some of the individuals or identifiable subgroup, in a group or 
groups that share a given identity, characteristic, or circum-
stance, while in ‘II’ the violation’s effects extend to all who share 
the same identity, characteristic, or circumstance. 
Critical legal thought asks, with respect to the periodic ad-
justments required to remedy the violation of the principle of 
equality whether: (I) adjustments, or corrective actions, ought to 
be undertaken at the beginning of a given relationship or social 
process that has the tendency to undermine the principle of 
equality; (II) at certain moments during a relationship or social 
process; (III) at the end of a given relationship or social process; 
or (IV) various combinations of ‘I,’ ‘II,’ and ‘III.’ ‘I’ defines a situ-
ation where correction of inequalities can only be undertaken—
which may prove to be a normative or practical limitation, or 
both—at the starting point of the relationship or social process 
that creates the equality violation. ‘II’ reflects corrective inter-
vention during the relationship or social process, thereby rear-
ranging the relative positions of individuals or groups before 
equality-undermining distributive results of the interaction may 
crystalize. In ‘III,’ at the tail end of the continuum, there can 
only be intervention—again for normative or practical reasons, 
or both—at the end of the interaction, and for the purpose of ad-
justing its distributive outcome according to some equality crite-
rion. Finally, ‘IV’ represents corrective interventions possible at 
the start, along the way, and/or at the end of a social interaction 
or process that reveals the potential to create inequality. 
With respect to the individuals or groups in whose favor cor-
rective intervention to promote equality is undertaken, the ques-
tion is whether the intervention is to be: (I) specific or (II) gen-
eral. ‘I,’ in this case, refers to correction that is restricted in its 
effects to the parties in a specific relationship or social process. 
‘II,’ in contrast, refers to corrective action whose distributive ef-
fects extend to all individuals or groups who share a relevant 
characteristic, identity, or circumstance with the parties directly 
or more visibly involved in the relation or social process that trig-
gered the corrective action. 
  
1052 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92 
 
Further, critical legal thought seeks to understand whether 
the scope of corrective interventions, relative to any undermin-
ing of the principle of equality, ought to be (I) specific or (II) 
structural. The distinction here is between two types of inter-
vention. The first type corrects unjustified inequalities through 
limited manipulation of its causes and conditions, but doing so 
without generally blocking those from continuing to be the 
source of inequality in the future. The second type seeks to de-
finitively reform structural aspects of the social relationships 
and processes causing inequality. 
Critical legal thought’s concerns with the two moments of 
freedom—that of emancipation and that of freedom stewardship 
over time—thus commits it also to equality. There are no free 
citoyens without human beings19 equal in the required ways. 
Consequently, a commitment to equality commits critical legal 
theory to a comprehensive and systematic jurisprudence of dis-
tribution, to which I now turn. 
FRAMEWORK FOR A JURISPRUDENCE OF DISTRIBUTION 
Distribution is a capacious concept that encompasses a 
range of intrinsic and relative goods, harms, actors, types of 
agency, and effects. In all its aspects, distribution elicits evalua-
tion and engages normative criteria. A jurisprudence of distribu-
tion as a component of critical legal thought must be a match to 
the conceptually capacious and robustly axiological nature of 
distribution. 
In fairness, every generation has jurists interested in distri-
bution.20 However, only once in every few generations do jurists 
 
 19. “Citoyens” and “species being” in Marx’s early terminology. See KARL MARX, 
ON THE JEWISH QUESTION, reprinted in MARX: EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS 28 (Jo-
seph O’Malley ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1844). 
 20. To remain within examples from the last 150 years: Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Rudolf von Jhering, Miguel Reale, David Trubek, John Rawls, Duncan Kennedy, 
Ronald Dworkin, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Posner, 
Cheryl I. Harris, and William Forbath, to mention just a few. Looking further back 
in time, Duncan Kennedy correctly submits: “Marx and Ricardo invent distribu-
tional analysis. But they don’t conceptualize it as distributional analysis of legal 
regimes. In fact, law figures in their work in a very mechanical, un-organic way, as 
a kind of inert background against which an economic conflict plays out.” Duncan 
Kennedy, Law Distributes I: Ricardo Marx CLS  (Feb., 2021)  (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). And Arnulf Becker on his part correctly states that “if 
one looks beyond the North, one sees the rise, during the 1960s and early 70s, and 
the fall, at the end of the 1970s, of Third World demands for a more egalitarian 
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rediscover en masse the importance of distribution analysis. We 
are once again in the midst of such a rediscovery (e.g., many of 
those working in disabilities law, law and economics, critical le-
gal studies, law and political economy, critical race theory, envi-
ronmental law, feminist legal theory, law and development, and 
socio-economic rights), with remarkable contributions already to 
show for it. However, compared to previous moments of ascent 
of distribution in legal thought, the current renaissance should 
have the greater ambition of bequeathing a general critical legal 
theory of distribution. 
While there are traditions of legal thought that highlight 
distributive questions (as those just mentioned above), they have 
thus far left an undersized theoretical footprint. Additionally, 
those traditions all too often forced the normativity and the pol-
itics of distribution into an orbit around immediately monetiza-
ble aspects of distribution such as income and employment. Of 
course, economics is an important part of any jurisprudence of 
distribution, but it is not coextensive with it. Economics is not 
even be the most important part of it, as the jurisprudence of 
distribution has its full meaning only in the theoretical arc de-
signed by freedom and curved by equality. 
The creation of a general legal theory of distribution is 
daunting work. It must integrate into a general theory of distri-
bution the analysis and evaluation of distributive patterns in a 
variety of contexts. From distribution in the modern state to 
transnational and international distribution, distributive im-
pacts on discrete groups (disability, race, age, gender, geogra-
phy, class, citizenship, and so on), areas of distributive interven-
tion and mobilization, expert governance of means efficiency and 
outcomes efficacy of distribution, and the history of distributive 
schemes and ideas—where to begin?  
One place to begin the work of a jurisprudence of distribu-
tion as part of grand critical legal thought is to identify the ele-
ments that any such theoretical efforts must integrate. The fol-
lowing list is significant in this pursuit. 
 
international order. Although Third World activism faded away, looking beyond the 
North reveals that their redistributive legal strategies have subsisted until today” 
Arnulf Becker Lorca, Bargaining with Sovereignty, Fighting Global Inequality. 
(Apr., 2021)  (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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ELEMENTS OF A JURISPRUDENCE OF DISTRIBUTION 
• Object: Distribution patterns and distributive events are 
everywhere in nature and society. However, we care only 
about distribuends deemed to matter (e.g., respect, epis-
temic authority, punishment, risk, calories, disinfor-
mation, income, time, etc.). That presupposes a theory of 
inherent and instrumental significance that illuminates 
the features that render anything distributable an object 
of distribution concern. Analysis of distribution is evalu-
ative in this first, and unavoidable, mode. 
• Agent: State, International Organizations, Private Agent. 
They are all involved in distribution, in myriad for-
mations. Such formations need to be identified, de-
scribed, explained, and evaluated. 
• Agency: Creating, Sustaining, Resisting, etc. distribution 
schemes and patterns. The types of distribution agency 
also need to be distinguished, explained, and evaluated. 
• Action: Direct (e.g., provision of basic income), Indirect 
(e.g., job creation incentive program) or Hybrid (e.g., com-
bination of temporary income replacement with job re-
training) are types of distributive action the understand-
ing of which a legal theory of distribution must reveal 
with a view to generalization and systematization. 
• Effect: Concentrative (e.g., taxation), Decentrative (e.g., 
mandatory employees’ participation in profits) or Con/de-
centrative (e.g., tax incentives and power of control for 
donor-advised funds in Time 1 → free cancer treatment 
for children in Time 2) and vice versa. A jurisprudence of 
distribution must overcome the naïve “concentration = 
bad, decentration = good” superficialities that plague 
analysis of distributive effects. 
• Long-Term Effects for Society: Cohesion or Fragmenta-
tion, Mobility or Immobility, Stratification or Equaliza-
tion, and the like. The ancients had already learned that 
in patterns of distribution hinge the cohesion or 
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fragmentation of social orders. A jurisprudence of distri-
bution would assist in the relearning of this lesson. 
• Long-Term Effects for Politics: Legitimization or Delegiti-
mization, Emancipation or Oppression, Destabilization 
or Stabilization, etc. The ancients knew this too,21 and 
this is another lesson in need of relearning. 
• Time of Effect for Individuals and Groups: Immediate 
(e.g., unemployment benefits) or Protracted (e.g., public 
education). 
• Frequency of Effect: Onetime (e.g., disaster relief) or Re-
current (e.g., greenhouse gases exposure). 
• Extension of Effect: Prompt (e.g., disaster relief converted 
into consumed calories) or Continued (e.g., disaster relief 
converted into small business creation), Intrageneration-
ally or Transgenerationally, etc. 
• Impact: Simple (e.g., episode of hunger placation or vote 
suppression) or Compound (e.g., lifespan increase or 
group disenfranchisement).  
• Epistemic Confidence: Skeptical, Moderate, or Robust. A 
jurisprudence of distribution must confront the difficult 
questions about levels of cognitive confidence regarding 
the cognition of consequences of distributive interven-
tions and of the causes of distributive outcomes. 
• Evaluation of Means: Efficient or Inefficient, Inclusive or 
Exclusive, Disrespectful or Respectful, Stigmatizing or 
Lustrative, and so on. 
• Evaluation of Outcomes: Just or Unjust, Efficacious or In-
efficacious, Liberating or Oppressive, Right or Wrong, 
etc.  
 
 21. Think here of Solon’s reforms in the 6th century BCE. 
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• Timeframe of Evaluation: Retrospective, Current, or Pro-
spective. 
• Source of Personal Evaluation of Distributive Outcomes: 
Impulse, Intuition, Emotion, Socio-psychological Condi-
tioning, Adherence to a Theory of Justice, etc.  
• Justification of Evaluation of Distributive Outcomes: Ra-
tio-constructivism (e.g., theories of social justice, human 
endowments approaches, etc.) or Conventionalism (e.g., 
reliance on prior prevailing distributive preference 
among members of a group or an audience).  
The wide-ranging nature of these elements of a jurispru-
dence of distribution points to a high level of social complexity. 
A critical jurisprudence of distribution is thus part of a general 
theory of the nature and evolution of the type of legal order that 
affords a high level of social complexity. 
CONCLUSION 
High-complexity societies are so by virtue of demographic, 
economic, institutional, cultural, political, geopolitical, cogni-
tive, technological, self-referential, and communicative aspects, 
each reaching both qualitative and quantitative thresholds. The 
moment at which these elements all reach their respective 
thresholds, their interrelationship activates the transformation 
in societal type from simple or complex to highly complex, with 
significant implications for social order. 
Simple societies could achieve social stability through nor-
mative inertia.22 In contrast, our high-complexity societies only 
achieve social stability as constant functional adaptation and ax-
iological steering through constant small and sometimes large 
normative changes. Distribution is an aspect of each of these 
changes; an aspect the standard model of critical analysis only 
partially understands. Critical legal thought avoids the project 
of developing a general legal theory of distribution to accompany 
 
 22. The literature on the normative lives of “primitive,” “archaic,” or “illiterate” 
societies is immense. A place to start would be HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT 
LAW (1861), and its critical revisions. 
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those changes and the social orders they produce at significant 
intellectual peril. 
 
 
